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Summary 
The European Union’s policy towards the Western Balkan states (Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia, Kosovo and Albania) has strongly emphasised 
the need for economic liberalisation and socio-economic reform. Yet, with the exception of 
minor success stories, this has not resulted in competitive market economies. Some countries, 
such as Bosnia and Kosovo, have still not returned to their economic performance before the 
Yugoslav wars, while even the front runners Slovenia (which joined the EU in 2004) and 
Croatia (which became an EU Member State in 2013) have been severely affected by the 
most recent financial and economic crisis. This paper argues that rather than focusing on 
economic reforms in the Western Balkans, it is important to support the establishment and 
consolidation of the political conditions for economic development and growth. Too often, so 
the main argument, have the EU and other international bodies focused too strictly on 
liberalisation and social reform, thereby neglecting underlying political considerations that 
strongly hamper socio-economic progress in the region.  
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Introduction 
 
Twenty-five years after the failure of the last Congress of the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia started the dissolution process of the state and a decade of war, sanctions and 
economic downturn, the region of the former Yugoslavia (and Albania) looks very different. 
Slovenia and Croatia have become EU Member States, other countries in the area have seen 
remarkable economic growth figures over recent years. All in all, the seven states that make 
up the Western Balkans (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia, 
Kosovo and Albania) have developed very differently in the last 25 years. Some have 
successfully consolidated democratic institutions, settled their disputes with neighbouring 
countries and either joined the EU (Slovenia and Croatia) or are making good headway 
towards membership in the Union (Montenegro). Others still have to deal with the 
consequences of war and conflict, inter-ethnic tensions and weak democratic institutions 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania). Serbia, while also a candidate 
country for EU membership and currently in negotiations to join, has still not fully 
consolidated its statehood (Kosovo-question) and its democratic institutions.1  
 
The European Union (EU) has been heavily involved in the region since the late 1990s, 
providing a perspective for future membership to all Western Balkan states, and also 
supporting political, economic and societal transformations. To support the economic 
development of the region, the EU’s policies focused on market liberalisation, privatization 
and socio-economic reforms to support more flexible and investment-friendly conditions for 
economic development. In many respects, these reforms have been successful in creating 
liberalised markets. Reforms of the employment laws and social welfare systems have 
created very flexible provisions. As a leading expert has recently argued, “The Western 
Balkan candidate and potential candidate countries do seem to have functioning market 
economies – but markets that function in a sense ‘too well’, without any countervailing 
powers or automatic stabilizers that would be provided by an effective system of social 
protection.”2 This means that while it can be argued that all of the Western Balkan states 
fulfil the basic criteria of a functioning market economy, these cannot be compared to similar 
economies in EU Member States. Three basic reasons can be identified for this: First, while 
the markets in the Western Balkans are liberalised and functioning as market economies, they 
are not competitive.3 This is not only the case when comparing these countries to leading 
European economies such as Germany and France, but also in a wider regional setting, 
Bosnia and Kosovo are not competitive when compared to Turkey or Slovenia. Second, 
unlike EU Member States, there are no provisions for financial assistance or bail-outs in case 
of financial and economic crises. Most of the Western Balkan states have been hit very hard 
by the most recent financial and economic crisis, for example Croatia’s economy shrank by 
about 11 per cent in recent years. However, local banks could not cope with the financial 
pressure. This has resulted in a banking sector which is mainly controlled by European banks. 
It has, however, meant that the countries themselves needed to deal with the economic 
downturn, growing social spending and reduced tax income. While the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) has provided emergency loans to numerous countries in the wake of 
the crisis, there has been no European assistance and long-term support for overcoming the 
1
 For a good basic summary of the situation in the country see: Der Frust im ehemaligen Jugoslawien wächst. In: 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 January 2015.  
2
 Will Bartlett: The Political Economy of Accession – Forming Economically viable Member States. In: Soeren 
Keil / Zeynep Arkan (Eds.) The EU and Member State Building –European Foreign Policy in the Western 
Balkans. London and New York 2014, p. 228.  
3
 Ibid.  
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structural economic problems. The crisis has not only been longer in the region, with many 
countries only returning to growth in 2014, but has created an economic downturn which 
many find difficult to overcome, including EU Member State Croatia. Third, more so than in 
any other European country, political issues remain at the heart of weak economic 
performance and the stronger impact of the recent crisis in the Western Balkans. Hence, 
while economic reforms have created basic free market economies, these operate in difficult 
socio-economic conditions and face numerous political obstacles. While there has been some 
work on the economic situation and suggestions for reforms, this paper aims to concentrate 
on the political conditions which influence economic performance. To do this, the paper will 
first discuss the starting point for the Western Balkan states and will then point out key areas 
of the political circumstances in the countries, which affect the countries’ economies. The 
Conclusion will demonstrate that a new focus on addressing these political issues is needed in 
order to create better conditions for economic growth and sustainable socio-economic 
development in the area.  
 
The Starting Point     
 
 All countries in the Western Balkans started from a difficult historical legacy. The socialist 
systems in Yugoslavia and Albania broke down in the early 1990s, in Yugoslavia this was 
followed by inter-ethnic violence in Croatia, Bosnia and later in Kosovo and Macedonia as 
well. Their economies were heavily affected, not only by the inefficiency of the socialist 
tradition and the strong focus on industrial production, but also by war, conflict, inter-ethnic 
tensions, population displacements and a lack of investment in infrastructure. After its failure 
to stop the conflicts in the Western Balkans in the early 1990s, the EU became more and 
more involved in the reform processes of the Western Balkan states after 1999. This 
involvement showed some success, and between 2003 and 2008, growth rates averaged 4 per 
cent or more in all countries. However, this economic progress was financed by foreign direct 
investment; the internal markets remained weak and dependent on credits from foreign banks. 
Important market reforms were implemented, however, the focus was on liberalisation and 
the creation of free markets, rather than on sustainable growth. This was to become a major 
issue once the financial crisis hit the EU, as many investors withdraw their money from the 
Western Balkans. This left the economies exposed and vulnerable, as domestic consumption 
could not cover for the lack of foreign investment. With limited possibilities to de-value their 
currencies (because they are so closely linked to the Euro), a spiral of new debt, more social 
spending and a lack of economic investment developed, which many countries have so far 
been unable to escape. The result was a massive economic downturn in all countries, often 
accompanied by further market liberalisation and cuts to the already weak social welfare 
systems. In most Western Balkan countries a double-dip recession followed in 2012, in 
Albania in 2013.  
 
Even after the crisis growth rates stood at 1 per cent, rather than the 4-5% that many countries 
saw before the crisis, although in 2015 higher growth is forecasted in numerous countries 
including Kosovo and Macedonia. Furthermore, all countries continue to face soaring high 
unemployment rate, which put a strain on countries’ budgets and threaten social cohesion. 
Protests in Bosnia in Spring 2014 were about failed economic reforms and similar issues 
brought people to the streets in Slovenia and Croatia as well. Additionally, it is important to 
highlight that the economies of these countries remain dependent on aid and support from 
external organisations, including the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Many 
sectors of the economy are controlled by tycoons, who are strongly linked to ruling political 
elites. Political elites often control employment in the public sector as well, which is the main 
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source of “safe” employment in the majority of Western Balkan countries. Public expenditure 
in Croatia and Bosnia for example limits possibilities for investment in other economic 
projects and is a major burden on public finances. While this is less the case in Albania and 
Macedonia, dependence on jobs in the public sector also explain patronage and corruption in 
numerous countries, including Bosnia and Montenegro.    
 
The focus of economic reform in these countries has been on market liberalisation. However, 
underlying issues in the political systems, societal arrangements and welfare reform have 
been neglected. Economic growth will not return to a sustainable level, and these countries 
will continue to suffer harder than other European countries in case of another 
financial/economic crisis until these underlying issues are addressed. Hence, it is important to 
look at these political problems, discuss them in detail, and explain how they affect economic 
performance.  
 
The Political Conditions for Economic Growth 
 
1. The Statehood Question 
 
As Will Bartlett argued,4 while all Western Balkan states fulfil the basic criteria of a free 
market economy, they are neither competitive nor able to deal with economic and social 
crises. This is linked to the question of stateness and consolidated statehood. Many countries 
in the area, from Bosnia to Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia, face fundamental internal and 
external challenges to their statehood. While Bosnian statehood remains contested by 
political elites in the Republika Srpska, the mainly Serb-inhabited entity in Bosnia; Serbia 
and Kosovo still struggle to define their relations, despite closer cooperation in light of both 
countries’ EU aspirations. In Macedonia, there have been renewed tensions between 
Albanians and Macedonians in recent years, as a result of lacking progress in terms of EU 
and NATO integration. Kosovo itself remains at odds with the Serbs in North Kosovo, who 
are still not fully integrated into the Kosovan.  
 
Consolidated statehood is important for economic development, not only because it is a key 
criteria for the success of democratization processes.5 The state acts as a regulatory 
framework. In this role, a state ensures the rule of law, pushes for a specific economic model, 
provides a legal setting for taxation, supports the investment environment and ensures 
changes and reforms to existing laws as required by socio-economic demands (for example in 
the area of employment law and social welfare). Moreover, the state is also a service 
provider. It is responsible for certain services, which directly impact on economic 
performance, such as welfare and public-private partnerships. In the Western Balkans, the 
role of the state as an employer is also important to highlight. Jobs in the administration are 
often better paid and safer than many jobs in the private sector. However, the focus of 
reforms in recent years has not been on making the bureaucracy more efficient and 
independent from political influences. Instead, in many countries the bureaucracy remains 
highly politicised and struggles to implement laws and regulations efficiently. The issue here 
is not so much of a non-existent bureaucracy, but one which is political and incompetent. In 
Bosnia and Kosovo, for example, employment in the state bureaucracy is directly linked to 
the loyalty to certain political parties.  
 
4
 Ibid.  
5
 On this see: Juan Linz / Alfred Stepan: Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation – Southern 
Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore 1996.   
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2. The Rule of Law 
 
The rule of law is fundamentally important for economic development. Investors want to 
know that their investment is safe, that there are regulations that protect them and legal ways 
to challenge those that might try to steal from them. Furthermore, the rule of law does not 
only protect big foreign investors but also small and medium enterprises (SME), the 
backbone of most modern economies. A functioning rule of law means that corruption is 
efficiently fought; there are clear provisions on how to open a business and protection from 
the police and against unlawful competition and threats. Yet, in most Western Balkan 
countries corruption remains widespread, permissions to open a business are often hard to get 
and time-consuming, and police and legal services are themselves involved in corrupt and 
illegal activities. All of this highlights the need for a functioning and independent 
bureaucracy as part of a consolidated state, but what is more is that often these practices are a 
result of existing realities. The black and grey markets function so well in the Western Balkan 
countries, because there is a general lack of employment opportunities, with official 
unemployment between 20 and 40 per cent. Salaries are often very low and not enough to 
cover the basic living costs, which invites corrupt practices. Political connections between 
bureaucracy and ruling elite provide an unhealthy environment, in which investors face strict 
restrictions not only politically but also in their economic activities. The often limited social 
welfare provisions make transitions and privatization especially painful, as there is no social 
security for those losing their jobs or willing to re-train and re-enter the labour market. 
Hence, this supports clientilistic networks, in which everyone wants to keep the job they have 
and swears allegiance to those that supposedly protect this job.  
 
There have been many initiatives from the EU, including the EULEX mission in Kosovo, 
which have focused on strengthening the rule of law and enhancing good governance. These 
have all, however, had a limited impact. Judges are still appointed by political bodies in 
countries like Serbia, while there is a history of threats against NGOs and other activists who 
work actively against corruption and for better legal protection. However, without a stronger 
focus on the rule of law, economic development will be limited, investors will be frightened 
to provide funding, and the bureaucracy will remain politicised and inefficient. The main 
reason why all these initiatives have failed is not because they were designed wrongly or 
tackled the wrong issues. Often it was a lack of political commitment by the political elites, 
who fear for their own benefits, and by the EU, which often accepted half-hearted reform 
efforts instead of deep-rooted cultural change. The danger of this, of course, is creating more 
situations like the one in Romania, which clearly was not ready for EU membership in the 
area of the rule of law and the fight against corruption, when it joined in 2007. 
 
3. Human Capital and Social Welfare Systems 
 
While the former Yugoslavia had a large number of well-trained employees, many of those 
are now retired, or have indeed settled permanently abroad. The new states have not been 
able to produce a highly qualified workforce, which would also support economic reforms 
and political democratization. The reason for this is not that people do not want to be trained 
or do not gain qualifications anymore. The reasons are mainly political, education systems 
are out-of-date and in some countries such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia, ethnic tensions 
seriously affect the quality and commitment to universal education. Albania recently shut 
down 18 higher education institutions, demonstrating the massive rise of private universities 
which often award degrees on a dubious basis and fall outside of any quality control by state 
officials. Vocational training enjoys very little support in the region, yet it offers another 
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possibility to train the workforce and allow specialisation. Population displacement and 
ethnic cleansing in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo have had a further effect on social mobility. 
People try to get jobs in EU Member States, but not in neighbouring countries.  
 
The countries also remain highly dependent on payments by ex-patriots who sent money 
“home” to their family. This form of revenue, essential when the average income is too low 
to cover basic costs, was highly affected by the recent crisis, as these payments from overseas 
were substantially reduced. As a result, not only domestic consumption slowed down, 
because people had less money to spend, but many people across the region were forced into 
poverty. Weak social systems have also been unable to address rising unemployment figures 
in light of privatization and economic downturn. People know that if they lose their job, they 
will not be protected; they will easily slide into poverty. Hence, this support clientilistic 
networks, corruption and nepotism, as well as grey and black market activities. Functional 
welfare systems in Eastern European countries have supported economic transitions, because 
people found it easier to lose their job, re-train and find new employment.6  
 
4. Historical Legacies 
 
Historical legacies matter in the Western Balkans. While the countries face similar economic 
legacies to the countries in Central and Eastern Europe (although Yugoslavia had its very 
own version of self-management socialism), the legacies of violence, war, ethnic cleansing, 
population displacement, new social networks and clientilism, shadow economy, physical 
destruction, and years of economic sanctions and mismanagement after the end of the 
conflicts in the 1990s have a lasting impact. These legacies matter, because they directly 
influence social mobility, regional cooperation and the willingness of people and political 
elites to reform and adapt to the new post-war order. The fact that the political elites of 
Kosovo were mostly involved in the war in 1999 and that major elites involved in the 
Bosnian war (1992-1995) remain in charge politically and economically in parts of the 
country, demonstrates this. Because of the ongoing tensions in Bosnia, numerous 
infrastructure projects could not be completed, because the entities cannot agree upon who 
should pay for these and be in charge of them. In Kosovo, the North has more and more 
integrated into Serbia instead of Kosovo, despite agreements between Belgrade and Pristina 
to re-integrate the territory into the Kosovan state. In Macedonia, Albanian and Macedonian 
territories have developed independently and very differently. While the Macedonian 
government has been relatively successful with investment areas and business parks, the 
Albanian territories in the South-West have profited from local business developments and 
strong economic links with Kosovo and Albania. In many countries, including Croatia, Serbia 
and Albania, cities have profited more from economic growth than rural areas which remain 
dependent on funding from the central state.  
 
The EU has tried to make economic cooperation between the Western Balkan states a key 
condition for membership and has supported the Stability Pact and its successor the Regional 
Cooperation Council, which support local initiatives for economic and social cooperation. 
However, this has had a diverse impact on countries. While the Central European Free Trade 
Area (CEFTA) has indeed increased regional trade and economic links, this is more 
important for some countries than others. Croatia for example is economically strongly 
entangled with Bosnia and Serbia as well, but other countries in the region depend much 
6
 On the issue of social welfare see: Will Bartlett: Europe’s troubled region: economic development, 
institutional reform and social welfare in the western Balkans.  Abingdon 2008.  
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more on their trade with EU countries. One of the success stories in Central and Eastern 
Europe was new infrastructure and economic projects that enabled international businesses to 
settle and use the countries’ advantages in terms of a highly trained work-force and cheap 
labour costs effectively. While some progress in infrastructure investment has been made in 
Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia, countries such as Bosnia and Kosovo still need to restore 
major parts of their infrastructure and develop competitive business strategies to compete not 
only with their neighbouring countries, but with other EU Member States as well.  
 
Political Reforms and Economic Development   
 
As the discussion above has demonstrated, many of the economic problems in the Western 
Balkans, especially those that have become apparent after the recent financial crisis, are 
home-made and linked to political issues. This has three important consequences. First, 
political reform and the willingness to put economic development high up on the agenda are 
key to long-term sustainable development in the region. Hence, a focus on “economics-only” 
does not only promise little success, it might in fact contribute to a climate in which political 
problems are ignored. This is why the German-British initiative for economic reform and EU 
integration in Bosnia promises little success.7 While it aims at re-starting economic growth 
and socio-economic progress, it misses the key problems that hold Bosnia back: ethnic 
divisions, political blockades and elites who are more focused on their own benefits than on 
the future of the country. Second, when asking the question which reforms the region needs 
and how these can be achieved, no new conditionality is necessary. A strict focus on the EU’s 
acquis communautaire would be enough to address the majority of issues described above. 
While the acquis does not deal with problems such as historical legacies, it does address 
questions of statehood, the rule of law and competitiveness of the market. The key problem 
here is that enlargement is (and always has been) a foremost political, and not a technical 
process. Yet, when looking at the economic development of the Western Balkan region, a 
focus on the technical criteria of the acquis is not a bad idea. It lays the foundations of how 
Member States should look like, and further details have been provided for example in terms 
of the banking sector in recent years. While the political commitment of Western Balkan 
enlargement is certainly important, and necessary, political progress should nevertheless 
depend on the fulfilment of technical criteria, in particular in the area of economic 
transformation. Third, when thinking about which reforms are actually necessary and will be 
successful and in the medium- and long-term, a number of possibilities come to mind: 
 
1. Strengthening the State 
 
Consolidated statehood remains central for economic development. While we have learnt in 
the last two decades from the success of China, that the state does not need to be democratic 
to develop successfully economically, it nevertheless needs to be consolidated and capable of 
using its coordinating and regulatory power effectively.  
 
2. Social Security Matters 
 
Social security is often underestimated in the discussion about functioning market economy. 
Yet, it is an essential part. Not only does the lack of social security explain patronage and 
7
 The text of the initiative is available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/bosnia-herzegovina-a-new-
strategic-approach For a critique of this approach see: Kurt Bassuener / Toby Vogel / Valery Perry: Retreat for 
Progress in BiH? – The German-British Initiative, DPC Policy Paper, Sarajevo, Berlin, Brussels, November 
2014.   
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clientilism, but effective social security systems also demonstrate that the state is able to fulfil 
its role as a supporter of economic change. 
 
3. Improve Investment Climate 
 
The countries in the Western Balkans remain dependent on foreign investment. Hence, 
strengthening the investment climate is essential for the support of economic development. 
To do this, the state needs to involve the private sector more strongly in economic decision-
making, better enforce the rule of law and strengthen its anti-corruption policy especially 
against tycoons which dominate many business sectors in the Western Balkans.  
 
4. Regional Development and EU integration 
 
While the EU’s focus on regional development is strongly influenced by the policy of 
overcoming the legacy of violence and conflict in the region, a new strategy should be 
devised which combines regional development/cooperation with the EU integration of the 
Western Balkan states. What is important is that countries communicate and exchange ideas 
with each other. There are a number of economic success stories, particularly in Slovenia, 
Croatia and Macedonia, and other countries should be able to learn from these successes and 
copy them. This form of learning should also be linked to the EU integration of the Western 
Balkan states, and certainly requires a better coordination of different donors and agencies.  
 
5. Industrial Policy and Future Economic Planning 
 
The legacy of over-industrialisation that could be found in Yugoslavia and Albania during the 
socialist period has resulted in a massive reduction in industrial production in the 1990s. De-
industrialisation has resulted in job losses and social fragmentation. Yet, industrial policy still 
matters, and all countries in the Western Balkans will need it in order to prepare their 
economies for competition with each other and other EU Member States. The key is to 
develop an industrial policy which focuses on “smart growth” in areas where the countries 
can be competitive and have clear advantages. This has so far not been developed in the 
majority of countries, only Macedonia has made some progress in this direction in recent 
years – with some remarkable success in their policy to attract industrial production and 
businesses.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Economic transition and reform are long-term tasks of governments that often only think in 
four or five-year timeframes until the next elections. Yet, over the last two decades the 
countries in the Western Balkans have economically developed very differently. While there 
are some success stories, overall the story is grim, and especially in light of the most recent 
financial and economic crisis, the future is not very promising either. Having said this, as the 
discussion above has demonstrated, many of the problems that hinder economic development 
and have resulted in the negative effects of the most recent economic crisis on the region are 
political. The good news is that these issues can be addressed if there is political will to do so. 
This will of course mean very painful reforms and long-term planning, but if the EU were to 
support these reforms, real sustainable progress can be achieved. However, if no progress is 
achieved, the Western Balkans threatens to become the dark hole of Europe, economically 
backward, politically irrelevant and generally ignored. This will not only increase the spread 
of organised crimes and labour migration from the region to the EU, but it will also have a 
8 
 
profound impact on the socio-political make-up of the region itself. We can already see 
authoritarian tendencies in Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro. Open conflicts between 
political elites and the media, NGOs and even the arrest of opposition leader as most recently 
in Macedonia demonstrate a worrying trend that goes well beyond the region of the Western 
Balkans and includes countries as diverse as Hungary and Turkey. Failed economic reforms, 
the upsetting of the social make-up of these countries, and the feeling of being left behind in 
an ever-changing world with little hope of EU membership anytime soon, have brought to 
power semi-authoritarian regimes that promise quick solutions to complex long-term issues. 
While these regimes will ultimately fail to deliver, evidence from Hungary and Turkey 
suggests that once they have manifested themselves and control the major political 
institutions, they are very hard to get rid of, even when they fail to deliver and when their 
incompetence and involvement in corrupt practices becomes visible. Similar trends can be 
observed in some Western Balkan countries. The lack of economic progress and the social 
unsettling of the recent crisis have contributed to this development. It is in the interest of the 
EU, and everyone interested in the democratization, consolidation and EU integration of the 
Western Balkan states, to support economic reform, provide a clear perspective for 
membership and counter-balance authoritarian tendencies with a strong commitment to the 
conditions of the acquis, including the respect for democracy and human rights.     
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